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When considering the requirements for a global nuclear material accounting system, Russia’s 
experience in developing its domestic system deserves special attention for four reasons: 
First, Russia’s nuclear complex includes all of the types of nuclear facilities and nuclear 
material handling procedures that would be subject to a global system. Second, Russia has 
significant experience transitioning from an outdated system to a modern one. Third, Russia 
has operated its nuclear complex in a financially constrained environment and has relied in 
part on international assistance. Finally, the Russian nuclear complex is managed by many 
agencies with their own agendas, priorities, and visions of nuclear material accounting. This 
experience with an interagency environment may be a model for other countries. 
 
As a major nuclear power—in both military and civilian applications—Russia possesses all 
possible types of nuclear facilities, including all types of nuclear reactors, a complete range of 
fuel cycle facilities, storage sites, and several types of nuclear ships.1 Russia also possesses a 
wide variety of nuclear materials, including all types of uranium and various isotopic 
compositions of plutonium. These materials exist in both items and bulk accounting forms, as 
well is in a number of physical forms including metals, oxides, solutions, and salts. These 
materials are subject to a broad range of operations–at both the industrial scale and in smaller 
quantities for research purposes. Russia is also heavily involved in the domestic and 
international trade of nuclear materials. This results in a significant volume of nuclear 
materials transport—to include changes in ownership and in control and accounting 
requirements and systems. 
 
Russia began transitioning from its Soviet-era nuclear material accounting systems in the 
early 1990s. The Soviet Union was home to a comprehensive nuclear industry and nuclear 
materials accounting system. Thus, a modern system based on new standards had to be 
introduced into an operating nuclear complex. This process has confronted many challenges, 
in part because of the major cultural change that it required. After nearly 20 years of evolving 
the Russian system, some important issues remain unresolved. 
 
 
A broad range of stakeholders with diverse interests 
 
While the State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) controls the majority of the inventory 
of nuclear materials and facilities in Russia, at least four other agencies are involved in the 
handling of weapons-usable nuclear materials. In addition, the regulatory body, 
Rostechnadzor, and several agencies working with lower category nuclear materials are 
                                                            
1This last group is distinguished from other nuclear reactors due to the existence of certain characteristics related to accounting and control 




directly involved in nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) activities. The interests 
of all these agencies, as well as the Ministry of Justice, which does not work with nuclear 
materials but manages the development of regulations, need to be reconciled when defining 
requirements for nuclear materials control and accounting. 
 
It is mainly because of this interagency arrangement that a long-awaited revision of the key 
Russian regulation that defines requirements for nuclear materials control and accounting was 
enacted only in November 2012—two and a half years after a well-developed draft was 
published for public review. The key reason for this delay was a misunderstanding between 
the developers and the Ministry of Justice. While the developers did not appreciate the 
regulatory requirements and practices imposed by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Justice was unwilling to take into account nuclear security specifics and unique challenges 
distinguishing it from other areas of regulation.  
 
An analysis of Russian interagency relations in the area of nuclear materials control and 
accounting could provide insights that would be useful when trying to facilitate negotiations 
between stakeholders attempting to develop a global nuclear materials control and accounting 
system. For example, most Russian agencies handling nuclear materials, with the exception 
of Rosatom, work with nuclear materials in the form of items (primarily fuel assemblies) that 
they receive from Rosatom facilities. These types of materials are subject to different control 
and accounting requirements than materials in bulk form. Meanwhile, Rosatom plays the 
primary role in developing MC&A regulations and does not always take into account the 
specific conditions and types of materials used by other agencies and entities when 
developing its recommendations. The future global distribution of nuclear materials could 
resemble this arrangement, where most participants only have materials in the form of items 
and will not operate fuel cycle facilities with bulk-form materials. 
 
 
IAEA safeguards and Soviet material accounting practices 
 
A good system of nuclear materials control and accounting needs to include measures aimed 
at ensuring that nuclear material is not diverted for unauthorized use. These measures were 
articulated in “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States 
Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” 
(Model IAEA Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/153) adopted in June 1972. 
 
Article 32 of this agreement requires that “the State's system of accounting for and control of 
all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement shall be based on a structure 
of material balance areas, and shall make provision as appropriate and specified in the 
Subsidiary Arrangements for the establishment of such measures as: 
 
(a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material 
received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the 
quantities on inventory; 
3 
 
(b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of 
measurement uncertainty; 
(c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver 
measurements; 
(d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory; 
(e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and 
unmeasured losses; 
(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the 
inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into 
and transfers out of the material balance area; and  
(g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being 
operated correctly.” 
 
Safeguards agreements developed on the basis of this “model” agreement are mandatory for 
non-nuclear weapon parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As long as the 
Soviet Union/Russia maintains a nuclear weapons arsenal, it is unlikely to sign such an 
agreement. So while, the Soviet Union did contribute to negotiating and approving 
INFCIRC/153, its system of nuclear materials accounting and control is quite different than 
that specified under the model agreement. 
 
The Soviet system of nuclear material control and accounting was primarily concerned with 
financial accounting and the control of technology and industrial operations that included 
nuclear material. 2 The foundation of this type of control involved assigning continuous, 
personal responsibility for nuclear material to individuals at facilities. Once nuclear material 
arrived at a facility, it was placed under the personal responsibility of a specific employee. 
After that employee conducted an assigned technological operation, responsibility for the 
material was transferred to another employee who conducted the next operation. The nuclear 
material “path” through a facility was determined by documents that guided technology 
operations. To ensure accurate nuclear materials accounting throughout this process, every 
technology operation was assigned a standard level of irretrievable losses. Such a system 
does not require the measurement of materials or the evaluation of actual losses. It works as 
long as losses are within limits established for specific technology operations.  
 
To put this system in terms familiar to those who work with more traditional material 
accounting and control systems, a standard level of irretrievable losses was the only criteria 
for evaluating inventory differences. Under the Soviet/Russian system, inventory differences 
were simply the difference between nuclear material inputs and nuclear material outputs from 
a specific technology process. If the difference was less than the sum of standard levels of 
irretrievable losses for all technology steps involved, then the difference was not investigated. 
In other words, actual losses were not measured. Under more traditional MC&A 
                                                            
2This description of nuclear materials accounting and control is largely based on the following article: Alexander Rumyantsev, “State System 





requirements, losses must be either measured or evaluated using experiment-based methods, 
and the specific values of losses must be taken into account when calculating inventory 
differences. The criteria for inventory difference acceptability in traditional MC&A are 
driven by the need to prevent the loss of a significant quantity of nuclear material. The Soviet 
Union’s arrangements were somewhat mitigated by the fact that the system of personal 
responsibility was supplemented by tight control over all nuclear personnel by state security 
services. 
 
The control of technology operations with nuclear materials was supplemented by the 
financial accounting of nuclear materials. The key parameters in this type of accounting were 
the monetary value of materials and the changes in material value through technology 
operations. Parameters that are typically critical for material accounting and control, such as 
mass and isotopic composition, were considered secondary and controlled only to ensure that 
a final product complied with established specifications. Financial accounting, contrary to 
accounting based on measurements, does not take into account potential measurement errors. 
This approach is sufficient when accounting for items, such as fuel assemblies, that can be 
counted with high confidence, where the lack of tampering can be verified via use of tamper 
indication devices, or where an item has unique characteristics, e.g. surface microstructure. 
This approach is unacceptable, however, when accounting for bulk nuclear materials, e.g. 
pellets, powder, solutions, etc. 
 
Under this system, nuclear facilities had to provide financial accounting reports and take 
financial accounting inventories. The scopes and frequencies of these reports and inventories 
depended on the types of nuclear materials handled at each facility. These processes also 
didn’t involve physical inventories based on measurements but rather relied on 
documentation accompanying specific products, such as fuel assemblies.  
 
 
The development of Russia’s modern state system of accounting and control  
 
The Soviet Union began to introduce material accounting practices based on measured 
material balances in the mid-1980s, when it agreed to implement IAEA safeguards at a 
limited number of Russian nuclear facilities. The Soviet Union signed a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA on February 21, 1985, and the agreement entered into force on June 
10, 1985.3 One VVER-1000 reactor at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant and one 
research reactor at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow were the only facilities subject to IAEA 
safeguards. As a result of these activities, site-level MC&A systems that met IAEA standards 
were established at each of these facilities. A set of regulatory documents were also 
developed to govern safeguard activities at these sites. 
 
                                                            
3Agreement of 21 February 1985 Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the 




Not until the collapse of the Soviet Union did efforts to further improve MC&A in Russia 
receive additional impetus. The Soviet system was adequate for the social, economic, and 
political environment of a state with tightly controlled borders. This environment changed 
drastically after the Soviet Union collapsed, increasing the need for new approaches to 
MC&A. Russian political leadership recognized this, but significant changes in MC&A 
practices at Russian nuclear facilities only became possible after U.S. financial support 
commenced.  
 
On September 15, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued Decree #1923 “On Immediate 
Measures to Improve the System of Nuclear Materials Accounting and Safeguards.” This 
decree ordered the government to: 
 
 establish an interagency commission to review the status of accounting and physical 
security practices for nuclear materials; 
 initiate the development and implementation of a State System of Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials that included the development of federal regulations, the 
creation of a federal information system, the enhancement of state oversight 
inspections, the development of modern MC&A equipment, and compliance with 
international nuclear nonproliferation obligations; 
 identify additional funding to support the development and implementation of an 
SSAC; and 
 consider funding MC&A activities as a priority when developing the federal budget. 
 
On November 21, 1995, the President enacted the federal law “On the Use of Atomic 
Energy,” which was intended to govern civilian nuclear energy applications. The law 
identified nuclear material control and accounting as a key part of atomic energy use and 
defined all nuclear materials, regardless of ownership rights, as subject to MC&A. The goal 
of MC&A is to determine the actual quantity of nuclear materials, substances, and waste at 
each location, and to prevent the loss, unauthorized use, or theft of material. The law also 
provided Russian authorities, nuclear managers, and nuclear regulatory agencies with 
information on the availability and movements of nuclear materials. Perhaps most 
significantly, the law established MC&A as the responsibility of nuclear facility operators. 
 
 
Russian MC&A regulatory documents 
 
Russian industry officials and experts have created a set of regulations establishing MC&A 
requirements for the state and facility levels. This regulatory framework is made up of three 
key documents. The first, the above-mentioned federal law “On Atomic Energy Use,” 
established the fundamental requirement that nuclear facilities have MC&A systems. The 
second, Government Decree #352, was issued on May 6, 2008. This decree, known as 
“Regulation on the State System for Nuclear Material Accounting and Control,” established 
the structure of the state system and the key responsibilities of all stakeholders, including 
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government authorities, operators, and supporting organizations. This decree superseded a 
similar decree that was issued in late 1990s. 
 
The third key regulatory document is the “Basic Rules of Nuclear Materials Accounting and 
Control,” which is known in U.S. and Russian MC&A communities by its Russian acronym: 
OPUK. This document, which is similar to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, established 
mandatory MC&A requirements for all entities operating nuclear facilities and handling 
nuclear materials. This document defines the necessary components of site-level MC&A 
systems and the requirements of these components. This document was initially issued in 
2001 and was revised in 2005 and 2012. Finally, government agencies have created dozens of 
regulations and standards that establish requirements for specific MC&A components, 
including material balance areas, physical inventories, systems of measurements, nuclear 
materials transfers, accounting and reporting documentation, tamper indicating devices 
(seals), personnel training, etc.  
 
OPUK is the most important regulation in this set, as it defines the comprehensive set of 
mandatory MC&A requirements for nuclear materials in civilian use. This document is used 
as a basis for issuing operating licenses to facilities, as well as for inspections conducted by 
Rostechnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory body. Violations of OPUK requirements can 
result in sanctions, including the withdrawal of a site’s operating license. 
 
Table 1. Specific MC&A activities and components included in current Russian 
regulations 
A measurement system able to determine quantities of nuclear material 
received, produced, shipped, lost, or otherwise removed from inventory, 
and the quantities in inventory. 

A system to evaluate the precision and accuracy of materials measurements 
and estimates of measurement uncertainty. 
± 
Procedures for identifying, reviewing, and evaluating differences in 
shipper/receiver measurements. 

Procedures for taking a physical inventory. 
Procedures for evaluating accumulations of unmeasured inventories and 
unmeasured losses. 
± 
A system of records and reports that show the inventory of nuclear material 
and the changes in that inventory for each material balance area, including 
receipts into and transfers out of the balance area. 

Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are 




While existing regulations cover most necessary elements of an MC&A system (see Table 1), 
industry officials and experts continue to work to improve the regulatory basis for MC&A. 
They are developing new regulations required to close existing gaps, and reviewing and 
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revising existing regulations to reflect changes and feedback from operations under current 
requirements. For example, industry officials and experts recently completed the third 
revision of OPUK. Specific improvements in the regulations that are worth noting, include: 
requiring that each site establish a designated MC&A organization; requiring that the book 
inventory be adjusted on the basis of a physical inventory taking; requiring the application of 
seals with unique identifiers to the most attractive categories of nuclear materials; and 
requiring the adoption of a two-person rule when accessing and working with nuclear 
material in certain situations.  
 
This latest version of OPUK addresses deficiencies in previous versions of the regulation and 
reflects the accumulation of MC&A experience at Russian nuclear sites. OPUK is not perfect, 
however, and future revisions will be necessary to close additional gaps (e.g., the need for 
trending analysis of inventory differences during consecutive physical inventories to detect 
potential protracted thefts of nuclear materials) that exist in part because some Russian 
facilities don’t have the capacity to meet current requirements. Three areas in particular 
require significant additional regulatory development: measurement methodologies, statistical 
analysis of physical inventories, and the evaluation of MC&A systems at the agency and site 
levels. 
 
Measuring materials and reconciling records for accounting purposes requires the use of 
methods certified at the industry level. Developing these types of methods also involves 
testing measurement processes to confirm that they are appropriate for specific measurement 
tasks and that they are sufficiently accurate. While some measurement protocols can be 
applied at multiple facilities, some are unique to certain facilities due to the specific 
technology that is used, equipment design, and the parameters of handled materials. While 
some methodologies have been developed toward this end, dozens more are likely still 
needed.  
 
The latest version of OPUK does establish the general requirement that statistical analysis be 
used at the completion of each physical inventory-taking. However, it does not establish 
specific requirements, goals, or criteria. Several Russian facilities are developing relevant 
analytical methods, but it will take several years for these methods to be fully developed and 
tested, for personnel to be trained in using them, and for facilities to acquire the necessary 
technological capabilities to conduct them. 
 
Government Decree #352 and OPUK establish the high-level requirement for the Russian 
government to maintain control over the State System of Accounting and Control and the 
importance of site-level self-evaluations. The regulatory documents that will provide details 
on implementing this requirement are under development with U.S. support. 
 
It is important to highlight two features of the institutional framework for MC&A activities in 
Russia. First, all nuclear materials in Russia are owned directly by the State or by State-
owned legal entities; weapons usable nuclear materials are owned only by the State. (A 
complete list of nuclear materials owned exclusively by the State is provided in Appendix A.) 
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These materials are subject to tighter accounting requirements than are non-weapon-usable 
materials. Second, civilian and defense nuclear materials have separate accounting systems. 
Available regulatory documents provide general information for how these two systems 
interact, however, detailed procedures are not available. 
 
There are three key stakeholders for MC&A regulation in Russia: Rostechnadzor, the agency 
responsible for establishing key requirements for MC&A and ensuring compliance through 
licensing and oversight inspections; Rosatom, the agency that manages SSACs, including the 
Federal Information System for Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control (FIS); and the 
nuclear sites themselves, which handle nuclear materials, develops site specific MC&A 
systems, and report changes in material inventories to the FIS. 
Other organizations with minor roles include federal agencies overseeing certain non-
Rosatom nuclear facilities and specialized organizations providing support in the areas of 




The Federal Information System  
 
To efficiently operate its SSAC, in 1996 Rosatom established the Federal Information System 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (FIS). According to Government Decree 
#352: “Rosatom is required to ensure the development, establishment, and operation of the 
federal automated information system for accounting and control of nuclear materials, 
establish information analysis organizations and (or) centers for information collection and 
processing.” 
 
The FIS is used to accumulate and analyze data on available nuclear material inventories and 
inventory changes at operating nuclear facilities. This data is then provided to federal 
authorities. The FIS consists of an Information Analysis Center, a Data Communication 
System, and site-level components that are used to generate information submitted to the 
Information Analysis Center. The key element of the FIS’s federal-level infrastructure is the 
Information Analysis Center, which is run by Rosatom. 
 
Despite these positive developments in Russia’s capacity to account for nuclear materials on 
the national level, two significant reporting issues remain. First, while most sites provide their 
reports in electronic form, paper-based reporting is still allowed. Second, information is 
provided to the FIS not from the level of a single material balance area, but from so-called 
“reporting areas,” which represent aggregates of several material balance areas. This structure 
simplifies reporting for complex facilities with multiple material balance areas, but it means 
that detailed data is not reported to the federal level. This type of data is maintained at the 
facility level and is available for review in case of inspections or requests for details. As a 





The impact of international nuclear security assistance on Russian MC&A standards  
 
Russian international cooperation, primarily with the United States, has been one of the most 
critical factors affecting the development of modern MC&A systems at Russian nuclear 
facilities. This cooperation has helped to resolve many of the cultural, technical, and funding 
obstacles to developing MC&A in Russia. 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union instigated U.S. support for a range of Russian nuclear-
related programs, including some aimed at material control and accounting. A March 1996 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report referred to the U.S. belief that the Soviet 
MC&A system accounted for nuclear material, but was “not complete, timely, or accurate.” 
The collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated some of the controls that had been effective 
under the old system and significantly increased the risk of nuclear materials theft. 
 
The U.S. Department of Defense sponsored the Cooperative Threat Reduction (also known as 
“Nunn-Lugar”) Program in 1993. And the Department of Energy launched its laboratory-to-
laboratory program in 1994. Both of these efforts included improvements related to MC&A: 
raising awareness of and training in MC&A best practices, developing Russian nuclear 
security culture, developing updated MC&A regulations, supplying Russian facilities with 
MC&A equipment, developing the Federal Information System, developing Rostechnadzor 
and Rosatom inspection capabilities, and conducting initial physical inventory takings at 
certain facilities. These cooperative programs remain active, but there have been changes in 
the way they are implemented. 
 
Education and Training. Personnel training has been perhaps the most important component 
of the cooperative programs. If MC&A personnel do not know how to do their jobs, other 
components of the system are useless. This is why the development of indigenous Russian 
training capabilities was a priority of the U.S.-Russian cooperative framework from the very 
beginning. In March 1994, U.S. and Russian officials decided to establish the Russian 
Methodological and Training Center (RMTC), which now spearheads Russian MC&A 
training efforts.4 After its establishment, the center conducted a training needs assessment 
that involved U.S. experts and representatives from Russian nuclear facilities. This 
assessment was then used to develop a training course and to inform decisions about 
facilities’ infrastructure needs. Today, the center features curriculum for more than 30 training 
courses that cover the complete scope of MC&A activities, including fundamentals, nuclear 
material control, non-destructive assay, statistical methods, development and use of MC&A 
software, and monitoring status of MC&A. These courses target a range of personnel 
categories–facility management, MBA managers, nuclear material custodians, members of 
                                                            
4U.S.-RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN METHODOLOGICAL AND TRAINING CENTER. 
Alan M. Bieber, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Greg Sheppard, Los Alamos National Laboratory, G. Pshakin, Institute of Physics and 
Power Engineering, Kate Bricker, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, R. Cross, PNNL, D. Dickman, PNNL, D. Ek, SNL,C. Key, 
ORNL, B. Ryazanov,, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, G. Sanord, LLNL, D. Liles, DOE/HQ. Presentation to the Institute of 




physical inventory taking committees, and inspectors. Several hundred students attend these 
training courses annually. New training courses are developed on an as-needed basis. 
 
To expand training opportunities, Russia has also established facility-level training centers at 
major facilities with U.S. support. Instructors at facility-level training centers are typically 
trained at the RMTC, receive support from RMTC officials in developing training courses 
tailored to the needs of specific facilities, and transfer their knowledge to facility personnel. 
 
In 2009, Russian officials issued a new regulatory document, “Methodological Instructions 
for Organizing and Conducting Initial and Advanced Training in the Area of Nuclear Material 
Protection, Control, and Accounting for Personnel at Joint Stock Companies, Institutions, and 
Federal Government Enterprises Under the Jurisdiction of the Government Corporation 
Rosatom,” to support the development and continuous updating of MC&A training programs 
at Rosatom nuclear facilities. This document established training program requirements and 
recommended the use of a systemic approach to training that is shared by U.S. experts. This 
approach involves five key stages of the training lifecycle: analysis, design, development, 
implementation, and evaluation. Such an approach allows officials to continuously improve 
training programs based on needs analyses and feedback from facility-level operators. Similar 
regulations were developed for several other agencies. 
 
In addition to professional training for industry personnel, U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts 
led to the creation of two university-level programs—at the Moscow Engineering Physics 
Institute and the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute—aimed at preparing graduates in the area of 
MC&A. These programs graduated their first classes in 1999, and they continue to prepare 
several dozen specialists annually. In contrast to the training center programs, the university 
programs cover a broad range of issues, including some MC&A topics. Graduates from these 
typically do not work as technicians or operators, but rather as system managers. (The author 
of this paper graduated from the program at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute in 
2000. One of his classmates now holds one of the most senior positions in charge of MC&A 
oversight at Rostechnadzor.)  
 
Development of MC&A regulations. As shown in Table 1, most MC&A issues are currently 
being addressed by new and revised Russian regulations. Most of these regulations have been 
developed with expert, organizational, and funding support provided under the U.S. MPC&A 
program. Officials have developed dozens of regulations aimed at different levels of the 
Russian nuclear complex, from Federal-level general requirements to detailed agency-level 
regulations and standards. Russian organizations have taken the lead in developing these 
regulations, while U.S. experts share their expertise when feasible. Despite the close 
cooperation between U.S. and Russian officials, certain Russian regulations differ 





Some regulations have been repeatedly revised since the late 90s. These revisions have 
attempted to incorporate feedback from the implementation of previous versions; they also 
reflect changing requirements on Russian nuclear facilities whose capabilities have grown. 
 
Supplies of MC&A equipment. Equipment used to measure nuclear materials and determine 
their isotopic compositions are the most essential pieces of hardware for the operation of 
MC&A systems. Other important equipment includes tamper indicating devices (TIDs), used 
to detect access to nuclear materials; bar-coding equipment; and other auxiliary equipment, 
such as information used for the automation of MC&A operations and for reporting 
accounting information to the FIS. 
 
An analysis conducted by the joint U.S.-Russian working group supporting the development 
of MC&A in Russia shows that as of December 2011, 1,188 items of measurement and bar-
coding equipment were available at Russian nuclear sites.5 This equipment includes scales, 
gamma-spectrometers, active-well coincidence counters, etc. Most of this equipment was 
purchased as part of U.S.–Russian cooperation efforts and was paid for by the U.S. 
Department of Energy.6  
 
The same analysis shows that an additional 143 pieces of equipment are currently needed and 
does not take into account equipment that will need to be replaced in the coming years. 
Ideally, Russian nuclear sites are supposed to have the capability to sustain their material 
accounting capabilities and purchase needed equipment using their own funding or funding 
provided from the Russia federal budget. However, most Russian nuclear sites expect that the 
United States will continue supporting new equipment purchases and the maintenance of 
available equipment.  
 
Development of the Federal Information System. U.S. support was critical to the development 
of the Federal Information System. While nuclear facilities are currently required to report to 
the FIS and pay for their site-level infrastructure from their own funds, most of the progress 
in this area has been achieved with U.S. funding. 
 
Cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on the FIS started in 1996; on the U.S. side, 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory played the most active role. 7 During the first stage 
of cooperation, from 1996 to 1999, officials created a conceptual design for the system; a 
prototype of the Information Analysis Center was developed, as was the infrastructure 




5http://www.vniia.ru/rgamo/rg/plan/doc/planrus.pdf. Page 23. 
6 The working group doesn’t explicitly report which pieces of equipment were purchased by U.S. funds, yet facility operators routinely 
report purchases of equipment, spare parts, and technical maintenance as a key part of their contracts with the U.S. national laboratories. 
7The Russian Federal Information System for Nuclear Material Control and Accounting: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. V. P. Berchik, 
MinAtom’s Situation and Crisis Center, L. A. Kasumova, MinAtom’s Situation and Crisis Center, R. A. Babcock, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, C. L. Heinberg, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, W. Kilmartin, U.S. Department of Energy, A.A. Martyanov, 
Minatom of Russia, V.A. Pitel, Minatom of Russia. Presentation to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, 2002 
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The second stage, which started in 2000, involved the full-scale implementation of the FIS at 
all civilian nuclear facilities. The first stage of the project revealed how difficult financially it 
would be for most Russian nuclear facilities to report nuclear materials inventory at the level 
of detail originally proposed for the FIS. As a consequence, both U.S. and Russian officials 
worked to revise reporting approaches for facilities with limited resources, while still 
providing authorities with a sufficient level of detail. 
 
The third stage of cooperation started in 2005, when the Joint Coordinating Committee—the 
main governing body of cooperation between U.S. and Russian officials—decided to 
emphasize the importance of the FIS’s long-term sustainability.8 The committee set the end of 
2012 as the date at which the system’s transition to sustainable operation should be complete. 
However, it remains unclear to what degree Russia is currently capable of supporting the 
system. While the federal-level infrastructure is available, the capabilities of individual 
facilities vary. Large, wealthy facilities can afford information systems that allow proper 
reporting in electronic form; small less-resourced facilities cannot. 
 
Initial physical inventory takings. Assembling complete, measurement-based initial physical 
inventories of nuclear materials is a key element of conducting MC&A. Yet, only a handful of 
Russian nuclear sites have conducted actual initial physical inventory takings that would meet 
international standards. Sites where initial physical inventories have been conducted include 
individual material balance areas at research facilities, where relatively insignificant amounts 
of nuclear material are handled. Major production sites, where dozens of tons of nuclear 
material are located, have not been subject to this type of inventory taking. This shortcoming 
is in part due to resource constraints. Complete, measurement-based physical inventory 
taking is extremely time consuming and requires significant human resources. 
 
At some point during the development of the FIS, Russian authorities concluded that the 
records of materials inherited from the old, Soviet system were sufficient to serve as a 
baseline for the new accounting system. More recently, some Russian facilities have 
expressed interest in completing measurement-based physical inventories; they’ve noted the 
need for initial physical inventory taking as part of their effort to consolidate legacy nuclear 
material in passive storage.  
 
Expert support and best practice exchanges. Expert support and best-practice exchanges 
within U.S.-Russian cooperation efforts have made important contributions to Russian 
nuclear security, including MC&A. By engaging directly with U.S. scientists and officials, 
Russian participants learned about U.S. best practices, used them in practice, and prepared to 
adopt tougher regulatory requirements. While benefits of these interactions to U.S. officials 
are not obvious, the exchanges allowed U.S. participants to familiarize themselves with and 
gain an appreciation for Russian approaches. 
                                                            
8Ensuring the Sustainability of Russian Federation National Nuclear Material Accounting System. Victor Pitel, Russian Federal Atomic 
Energy Agency, R. A. Babcock, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, L. A. Kasumova, TsNIIATOMINFORM, M. S. Kushnaryov, 





Expert support and best practice exchanges have taken on different forms, including: high-
level meetings to brief management on the issue at hand and to secure their commitment and 
support for best practices; formal workshops involving subject-matter experts and nuclear-
site personnel who share detailed technical information on particular issues; U.S. experts’ 
comments on Russian deliverables, including draft regulations, training materials, and 
elements of the system design; and translations from English into Russian of U.S. regulations, 
standards, books, and other materials covering issues of interest. 
 
In late 2012, Russian authorities stated that they did not intend to extend the CTR Umbrella 
Agreement that expired in June 2013, which served as the foundation for nuclear security 
cooperation. Three reasons are commonly provided for this decision: first, Russia has 
sufficient resources to take care of its nuclear security; second, liability indemnification 
provisions in the existing agreement no longer satisfy Russian interests; and third, U.S. access 
to Russian nuclear sites within the framework of cooperation reveals sensitive information 
about the Russian nuclear complex. This last reason is typically not voiced by official 
sources. 
 
On June 14, 2013, the United States and Russian signed a new bilateral framework on threat 
reduction. According the U.S. announcement about the framework, it “authorizes the United 
States and the Russian Federation to work in several areas of nonproliferation collaboration, 
including protecting, controlling, and accounting for nuclear materials.”  
 
 
Lessons learned for a global nuclear material accounting system 
 
Russia’s experience developing a modern MC&A system can provide several lessons for the 
implementation of a global nuclear material accounting system. For starters, all parties 
involved in such a system—from national authorities to individual nuclear site employees—
need to understand and acknowledge its potential value. If any of these parties fail to see the 
value in such a system, then the whole system will fail. Also, if a government doesn’t 
establish adequate MC&A requirements and properly enforce them, then nuclear sites will 
lack incentives to implement adequate MC&A measures.  
 
Second, advocates of a global nuclear material accounting system need to plan ahead, yet be 
prepared to adjust their plans as the development of such a system proceeds. Negotiation and 
implementation of the system will be time consuming due to sensitivities around this issue; 
and sustainability planning needs to be considered as an initial part of any multi-state 
negotiation. The key to sustainability is ensuring the financial commitment of participating 
countries. Some system participants will need support during the implementation of a global 
system, yet they need to be committed to supporting the system domestically over the long 
run. Without this type of support, the system would be supported by only a handful of 




Third, all stakeholders need to be involved, including governments, regulators, and industry. 
Involving all parties at the outset will help to avoid developing a system that would be hard to 
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APPENDIX A: List of Nuclear Materials That Can Be Owned Exclusively by the 
Federal Government9 
 
1. Uranium enriched to 20% and higher of U-235 excluding uranium: 
a) contained in the nuclear fuel of nuclear power plants, transportation power units and 
research reactors; 
b) contained in detectors of ionized radiation, targets of elementary particle accelerators and 
sealed radiation sources. 
2. Plutonium, excluding plutonium: 
a) contained in irradiated nuclear fuel or reactor fuel consisting of uranium and plutonium 
chemical compounds [cover MOX]; 
b) contained in sealed radiation sources; 
c) contained in detectors of ionized radiation; 
d) contained in targets of elementary particle accelerators; 
e) containing 80% or more of Pu-238. 
3. Nuclides: U-233, Np-237, excluding nuclides: 
a) contained in irradiated nuclear fuel; 
b) contained in sealed radiation sources;; 
c) contained in detectors of ionized radiation; 
d) intended for use in industry, science or medicine in the amount not exceeding minimum 
quantity established by federal norms and rules in the area of nuclear materials accounting 
and control 
                                                            
9In accordance with the President of Russia Decree #556 of April 27, 2007 “On Restructuring Nuclear Power Industry Complex of the 
Russian Federation” 
 
 
